




Abstract: Interdisciplinary works tends to have an inbuilt 
spatial logic, based, for example, on the model of the ‘layer 
cake’ – in which each layer encompasses a specific, tightly-
bounded domain. This chapter is about distributions of space 
and time in interdisciplinary projects, and a critique of the 
dominant spatial logics and metaphors that often prop up 
interdisciplinary endeavours. Against such imaginaries, the 
chapter sets out four alternatives for rethinking the space 
of interdisciplinarity: matrices, topologies, incorporations, 
laboratories. The chapter positions these alternatives as ways 
of imagining interdisciplinary space, beyond the logic of 
fiefdom that now predominates.
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Introduction
The distribution and use of space and time is a surprisingly potent – and 
fraught – topic in interdisciplinary projects. Funders, institutions, and 
researchers are increasingly paying attention to how physical buildings 
and centres might facilitate, or inhibit, interdisciplinary exchange (Dzeng 
2013). One of us (DF), for example, spent almost a year at the expressly 
interdisciplinary Interacting Minds Centre at Aarhus University 
(Interacting Minds Centre 2014), where doorless, all-glass offices 
fostered a sense of free movement and exchange. The Hub at Wellcome 
Collection, in which we have written this book, was explicitly designed 
to facilitate collaborative, interdisciplinary interaction. Similarly, people 
collaborating at a distance from one another will often place a premium 
on having tools and funds for getting themselves into a shared space, 
whether physically or virtually. These are important issues, of course. 
And yet, over the years that we have been moving through diverse 
interdisciplinary landscapes, we have come to realize that the spatial 
logic of interdisciplinarity isn’t only about the physical arrangement of 
offices and corridors: it’s also about the careful (though often unspoken) 
arrangement of people, objects, ideas, technologies, and media in rela-
tion to one another. It’s about the choreography – the ‘deftly balanced 
coming together of things that are generally considered parts of different 
ontological orders’ (Thompson 2005, 8) – through which those things 
are induced to relate to one another, as well as the habits and modes of 
comportment that, sometimes, prevent those people and things from 
getting too close.
In this chapter, we will be concerned with space in both senses (as 
physical entity and as choreography) – but we will pay closer attention 
to the second. Because it is precisely this tacit choreography, this highly 
elaborated dance of movement and fixture, we claim, that governs the 
distribution and use of time and space in interdisciplinary projects. Over 
the years that we have spent in interdisciplinary spaces that address the 
mind and the brain, we have become convinced, first, that the logic of the 
prefix ‘inter-’ tends to lie at the heart of those arrangements and chore-
ographies, and second, that that prefix acts as a serious hindrance to 
the kind of research that might be done across the neurosciences, social 
sciences, and humanities. Indeed, this deceptively harmless prefix tends 
to govern the suturing of discipline to discipline (often via a particular 
way of envisaging how experiment is best put into practice), and has 
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significantly constrained how interdisciplinary research in this area is 
both imagined and conducted. ‘Far from being opposed to disciplinar-
ity’, Thomas Osborne points out, ‘interdisciplinarity assumes a certain 
consciousness of disciplinarity as a condition for its accomplishment’ 
(Osborne 2013, 82; our emphasis). The problem for us with the prefix 
inter- is that it denotes both spatial and temporal ‘betweens’: it hence 
locates the point of interest between intervals of time, and between parts 
of things. The concept of interdisciplinarity, as it is currently practised, 
thus carries within it a very particular model of spatial and temporal 
relations – as if there were a chessboard of disciplines, weaving in and 
out of one another, but never occupying the same, uneven ground.
We want to break the spatial and temporal structure assumed by 
the inter- of interdisciplinarity. In its place, and drawing on our own 
experiences, we open other ways of imagining and unfolding the – in 
fact – much more tangled and patterned world of complex relations, 
and non-relations, between human and non-human entities, as well 
as between the various domains of knowledge that attempt to address 
them. For it is that tangled world – with its heterogeneous rhythms and 
mysterious arrangements – that is what those calling for interdisciplinary 
research involving the neurosciences and social sciences are attempting 
to understand and to intervene upon, even as they sometimes tend their 
own epistemologically bounded spaces. We are certainly not arguing 
that interdisciplinarity is found in just one form (for various examples of 
the heterogeneity of forms, see Schaffer 2013). As Barry and Born have 
noted, the question, rather, is: ‘How might one understand interdiscipli-
narity less as a unity and more as a field of differences, a multiplicity?’ 
(Barry and Born 2013, 5). Still, we argue that to understand the complex-
ity of brain–mind–body–environment relations, we need to jettison the 
spatial logics of the inter- if we are at all to make good on the promise 
that interdisciplinarity holds. In so doing, we work neither with a fantasy 
of pure, prior disciplines that the logic of the inter- attempts to make 
concrete (see also Osborne 2013), nor with an integrative vision in which 
different disciplines are tugged ever-closer to one another (see also 
Fitzgerald and Callard forthcoming). We ask our readers to join us on in 
departing from the temporal frameworks and spatial strictures to which 
so many of today’s practices of interdisciplinarity remain sadly tethered.
In this chapter, we are particularly preoccupied with the scales, rela-
tionalities, patterns, rhythms and voids that might be useful for under-
standing practices of interdisciplinarity, once we have abandoned spatial 
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logics that privilege either what happens ‘between’ disciplines, or that 
are premised on working towards their future integration. We reflect on 
the spaces, times, and rhythms – material and conceptual – that we have 
found most generative, in terms of fomenting epistemological excite-
ment and novel ways of practising collaboration. Here, as everywhere 
in this volume, one of our primary concerns is with developing new 
forms of experimental practice that also comprise, simultaneously, new 
forms for thinking around and with problems. Collaboration, is, for us, 
‘a distinctive and changeable set of practices, an object of enquiry, a field 
of dispositions, a relation of power, an intervention in a space, a set of 
affective and embodied comportments’ (Callard, Fitzgerald, and Woods 
2015, 4): how one envisages and organizes collaboration, then, is far from 
inconsequential in shaping how both experiment, and thinking with and 
through others’ concerns and models, might take place. But acknowledg-
ing and bringing to the foreground richer and less predictable accounts 
of the spaces and times in which collaboration across disciplines might 
take place is no easy task. Before rooting some of those accounts out, 
we first self-consciously divest ourselves of what we believe to be some 
of the more unhelpful assumptions about the ‘proper’ space and time 
of and for interdisciplinarity that we have – repeatedly – witnessed and 
experienced.
Have you got a neuroscientist yet?
Consider the vignette with which we started this book (see the 
Introduction), in which our group had not (yet) acquired the indispen-
sable neuroscientist. What does this vignette reveal? In retrospect, we 
realized that it exemplified the way in which a particular vision of inter-
disciplinarity involving the mind sciences, life sciences, social sciences, 
and humanities was being assumed – by funders, by institutions, and 
by many of those (including, at times, the two of us) who are gathering 
in this field. It carries strong prescriptions about what interdisciplinary 
research in this field is, how it should be carried out, whom it ought to 
enrol, what role each member of the team should perform in relation 
to the others, and what kinds of results should emerge from it. There 
ought to be a scientific experiment. The experiment should take place 
in a laboratory. It will, most likely, involve a scanner. (Increasingly, in 
our experience, fMRI is regarded as the default option, though positron 
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emission tomography (PET), electroencephalography (EEG), and other 
technologies are of course also possible.) The cognitive neuroscientist 
should be on hand to conduct the experiment and process the data; the 
psychologist should take charge of fine-tuning the protocol (sometimes 
the neuroscientist and the cognitive psychologist are subsumed within 
one person); the bioethicist should be there to soothe our consciences 
about any ethical implications of the study; the social scientist should be 
there to help assess the suitability of the sample and to comment on the 
generalizability of the findings; the philosopher should be there to ensure 
rigorous parsing and application of constructs (and to make the tea). The 
most important data to emerge are those produced through the coming 
together of the human experimental subject(s) and the scanner; these 
should be published in a neuroscientific journal (though ancillary publi-
cations that address other disciplines’ concerns are of course welcomed).
In short: what emerges here is a spatial imaginary centred on the model 
of a multi- (rather than inter-) disciplinary mix, a mix that will establish, 
it is hoped, a methodological and conceptual ‘layer cake’. (We are employ-
ing here the usual distinction between the multi-disciplinary, in which 
disciplines line up alongside one another, from the interdisciplinary, 
which usually carries some commitment towards creating emergent, and 
novel forms of knowledge different from those contained within any one 
discipline.) Within this layer cake, each disciplinary layer has dominion 
over a particular kind of expertise, particular methods, and particular 
objects of knowledge. You can see this play out in numerous published 
interdisciplinary books and studies that address the mind and brain (see 
e.g. Goldman 2006; Slaby and Gallagher 2015). Joseph Dumit, we should 
note, has provided a powerful analysis of how cognitive psychology was 
brought into contact with PET to produce the interdisciplinary layer 
cake that became the foundation of the interdisciplinary field of cogni-
tive neuroscience (Dumit 2004). We should not be unduly surprised, 
therefore, that the layer cake functions as the buttressing logic for other 
interdisciplinary endeavours involving the brain and mind.
There are a few examples that depart from the layer cake genre. 
Roepstorff and Frith, for example, in elaborating a model of experimen-
tal anthropology ‘as a method, as an object of study and as a research 
aesthetic’, argue that joint engagement (doing things together) in research 
projects across the disciplines leads to the need for researchers of all 
stripes then to ‘be sensitive both to the type of facts and the types of 
contexts produced by going experimental’ (Roepstorff and Frith 2012, 
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108). The dominance of the layer cake model, however, means that the 
methods and technologies of cognitive neuroscience tend to be endowed 
with a particular luminosity and generativity. And we emphasize that it 
is often social scientists and humanities scholars, rather than neuroscientists 
themselves, who manifest the greatest enthusiasm in doing so. In short, it is the 
brain scanning technology (of whatever kind) that ends up being granted 
the most substantial epistemological value (which nicely sits alongside its 
substantial economic weight). Experts from other disciplines can help to 
fine-tune, interpret, or contextualize what goes into it, and what comes 
out of it, but the work that the scanner does is where the real action is.
Such a model tends, at the same time, to embed a particular temporal-
ity at the heart of interdisciplinary labours in this arena. As soon as the 
cognitive neuroscientific fMRI study is installed as the groundwork of 
the collaboration, all are constrained by two particular timelines. First: 
when is the scanner available? (This is always a vexed question.) Second: 
how lengthy will the period of recruitment need to be to find people to 
insert into the scanner? The difficulty with this model is that its spatial 
and temporal characteristics occlude the multiple other modes through 
which collaborations might unfold, and through which interventions – 
into existing literatures, and into the worlds of experimentation and 
investigation – might take place. What would it mean to conduct an 
interdisciplinary experiment that did not orient itself around the tempo-
ral logic of scanner availability? What if the scanner had to wait, instead, 
on the very different – but no less fraught – timekeeping that is inherent 
to the ethnographic method? What if an interdisciplinary workshop, 
which had been initially planned so as to fine-tune the constructs 
under investigation in the forthcoming neuroimaging study, ended up 
determining that a neuroimaging experiment were not necessarily the 
most appropriate kind of experimental procedure to engage in? What 
if philosophers were freed up – and freed themselves up – to do more 
than maintain the conceptual rigour of psychological constructs? (For 
one example of this, see Haueis 2014.)
Good fences make good neighbours
“No: I don’t agree with your account of the permeability of disciplines, one 
to the other, at all. I do think that good fences make good neighbours.”
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Both of us were at the workshop at which a highly regarded interdisci-
plinary researcher conveyed this strong account of appropriate interdis-
ciplinary practice – one that defended disciplinary turfs and disciplinary 
expertise. The sentence above was spoken after one of us (FC) had coun-
tered what she interpreted as the academic’s territorialized landscape 
of interdisciplinarity with a question about the untoward relationalities 
unfurled by postcolonial studies – as well as by other interdisciplinary 
theoretical domains that have been committed to queering the pitch of 
orthodox histories and geographies. In many ways, we understood this 
researcher’s response. In calling for interdisciplinarity, no one wants to 
be misunderstood as championing sloppiness, and few, we imagine, want 
to be interpellated as the inevitable jack of all trades and master of none. 
We certainly would not want to find ourselves endorsing, say, an analyti-
cal philosopher who planned to get by in an interdisciplinary project, 
untrained, as a sociologist; we do not wish to champion an anthropolo-
gist who imagines she can, in a trice, become a conceptual artist. But 
in this chapter we want, nonetheless, to challenge the spatial logic of 
fences and neighbours – and the specific forms of territory it brings 
into being. Here is discipline thought through the figure of the happy 
householder – willing to reach over the fence, for sure, but still very keen 
to maintain a proper sense of where the boundaries lie. Indeed, there 
is an important claim embedded in this metaphor (and one hears it all 
the time) of good fences, insofar as it dramatizes what is still sometimes 
an unquestioned assumption about the primacy of the private space of 
disciplinary training.
Whatever our – and your – feelings about private property might be, 
it strikes us that there is a pernicious notion, embedded here, that maps 
intellectual inquiry on to the taken-for-granted boundaries of relation-
ships between public and private space. (In this regard, we find it intrigu-
ing that many writings that address cross-disciplinarity employ language 
that conjures private property relations. We might turn, for example, 
to the philosopher Brian Massumi, who discusses the ‘poaching’ of a 
scientific concept (which, moreover, on his account, does not result in 
‘prevent[ing] it from continuing to function in its home environment’, 
and who maintains that if he ‘were a concept, [he] could emigrate and 
stay behind in [his] home country’ [italics in original] (Massumi 2002, 
21)); or to Thomas Osborne, who describes interdisciplinary move-
ments via languages of poaching and trespass (Osborne 2013).) What 
would change, for the kinds of projects that we are trying to bring into 
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being, if we were to think though very different accounts of property, of 
home, of migration, of arrangement, and of distinction? What if we were 
to recall, for example, the commons that preceded those strong fences? 
What if we were to turn to forms of community relation, and of being-
in-common, that refused – for good and for ill – the always-assumed 
bourgeois propriety of neighbourliness?
After fiefdom
In her analysis of the intellectual terrain marked out by the term 
‘American Studies’, literary studies scholar Wai Chee Dimock demon-
strates how a ‘fiefdom’ has been drawn under the first half of that term, 
such that the founding adjective American comes to ‘[govern] the domain 
of inquiry we construct, the range of questions we entertain, the kind of 
evidence we take as significant’ (Dimock 2001, 755). Does not the adjec-
tive ‘interdisciplinary’ do the same kind of demarcation work? Consider 
how that term, for example, constitutes itself as a place of intensity and 
the site of boundary transgression; consider also how it sets out a specific 
range of allowable – and not allowable – modes of investigation; and 
how it, in so doing, in fact occludes the congealed, compacted ‘interdis-
ciplinary’ peregrinations of those ‘disciplines’ from which it apparently 
draws. For, as Philippe Fontaine reminds us, the dominance of the 
image of ‘two cultures’ (sciences and humanities), marked by fences and 
boundary-points, has tended to elide the distinctive history of the social 
sciences as a particular culture – and, in particular, the development of 
a post-war social scientific culture that was intensely ‘cross-disciplinary’ 
in both its intentions and its practices (2015, 2; see also other essays in 
that special issue of Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences). As 
Fitzgerald, Rose, and Singh (forthcoming) have argued elsewhere, there 
is a far more entangled palette of relationships between, say, psychiatry 
and sociology, or between psychology and political science, than those 
imagined in orthodox accounts of ordered interdisciplinary exchange. 
Andrew Pickering, similarly, has pointed out that cybernetics, far from 
simply combining existing disciplines, ‘amounted to the explosion of a 
nonmodern ontological stance across, and beyond, the disciplinary map’ 
(Pickering 2013, 217).
How might such insights help us to rethink the spatial and temporal 
commitments of interdisciplinarity (as well as those of ‘disciplinarity’ 
Choreographing the Interdisciplinary
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0008
on which they are founded)? Can we, as Dimock suggests in another 
context, ‘draw a different input map of the world’ (2008, 29)? Elsewhere, 
we have proposed a rethinking of the interdisciplinary scene through a 
logic of ‘experimental entanglement’ – in an attempt to gesture at our 
shared realization that working across the social sciences, neurosciences, 
and humanities was not at all about figuring out how to move fences, or 
how to work across them; instead it was about recognizing how tangled 
were the roots into which those stakes were driven into in the first place 
(Fitzgerald and Callard 2015). In advancing the spatial dimensions of 
that conceptual move, we offer, below, four additional terms that help 
us to think about the patterning and arrangements of interdisciplinary 
entanglements. What we hope is that these might move all of our imagi-
naries away from that of the layer cake, or that they might spark, in some 
readers, new and allied terms of their own.
Matrices
The spatial logics that underpin the management of interdisciplinary 
projects tend to fall, we believe, into two, not mutually exclusive, 
categories: (1) a dominant principal investigator, looking down upon all 
the disciplinary ranks; and (2) fantasized – and ever thwarted – parity 
across these ranks. Both logics envisage interdisciplinarity through the 
efficient arrangement of different-but-equal silos – to use the manage-
ment cliché. A matrix, by contrast, opens up a very different kind of 
spatial and temporal imaginary – one that attends more closely to the 
‘organizational physiology’ of the project, to use Bartlett and Ghoshal’s 
(1990) evocative term. The term matrix carries long histories. Alongside 
its use as a designator of the womb, it denotes the environment in which 
something is created or developed; it is also variously employed within 
biology, pharmacology, mathematics, business, sociology, and political 
theory. What draws us, then, to this term, is its history of promiscuous 
movement across terrains of expertise and interest, and the manner in 
which it draws attention to the multiple ways in which to understand the 
processes and pressures of connection, support, embedding, binding, 
and generation.
In the history of organizational design, matrix structures were cham-
pioned, against the bureaucratized hierarchy of the post-war years, as 
ways of putting things and people together, around specific questions, 
with an attention to the quality of lateral relations – pointing out that 
the unidirectional flow of information ‘up’ to a single manager of a 
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single department stymies both communication and creativity (see e.g. 
Sayles 1976). If we replace the ‘manager’ with the ‘disciplinary expert’, the 
power of the matrix for rethinking logics of collaboration becomes clear. 
And we need not seek inspiration only in the management literature: the 
complex and variable ‘meshwork’ of proteins that make up the extracel-
lular matrix of animal tissue was once thought to be an ‘inert scaffold’, 
but is now thought to play ‘a far more active and complex role in regulat-
ing the behaviour of the cells that contact it, influencing their survival, 
development, migration, proliferation, shape and function’ (Alberts 
et al. 2002). It is worth thinking further about how working with and 
through matrices might afford new means through which collaborative 
interdisciplinary projects and relations might be set into motion. One 
example, here, is Hubbub, though Hubbub is far from being the only 
place that we could turn. Hubbub’s Core Group (the principal investiga-
tor and co-investigators of the research project) have attempted precisely 
to attend to this pliable meshwork, much more than the cells – or silos – 
themselves. Collaborators, from whichever discipline, are encouraged to 
self-organize as they like, and communicate amongst themselves; disci-
plinary experts neither form teams around projects, nor tend to act as 
gateways to the joining of projects. We would certainly not want to imply 
that the project exists without checkpoints in some magical, frictionless 
space: we are sure that many collaborators could enumerate multiple 
ways in which they are baulked from moving, playing and binding. But 
we still contend that what is most at stake, around any individual project 
within Hubbub, is not the specific expertise a person ‘brings’, but rather 
her capacity to fold into, and expand, a matrix that is developing around 
a particular question.
Topologies
Across the sciences, social sciences, and humanities, the topological 
has become, in recent decades, a particularly resonant mode through 
which to map the enfolding relations that enjoin entities and constitute 
dynamics. Researchers in this mode draw upon topological theories, as 
they have emerged in the mathematics of continuous space, to think 
more broadly about the ways in which (as a series of events on ‘topol-
ogy’ as Tate Modern put it) ‘static ideas of space as a container [might 
be] replaced by understandings of movement-space, of multiplicity, 
differentiation and exclusive inclusion that in turn have led to new 
ideas of power, subjectivity, and creativity’ (Tate 2012). As Celia Lury 
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and colleagues have argued, ‘topology is now emergent in the practices 
of ordering, modelling, networking and mapping that co-constitute 
culture, technology and science’ (Lury, Parisi, and Terranova 2012, 5; our 
italics). The language of topology, as Martin and Secor have analysed, 
is one full of ‘flows, deformations, twists, folds, torsions, severations, 
and cuts’ – and thereby well positioned to be variously employed ‘as a 
metaphor, a heuristic device, an analytical approach, a figure, and an 
ontological relationship’ (Martin and Secor 2014, 421). We cannot but 
gesture here to the genealogies and theorizations of topology – which 
have dense histories in scientific, philosophical, social scientific, and 
psychoanalytic literatures.
We worry, then, that our invocation of the topological will function 
simply as yet more adulation for one of the terms du jour. But if we persist 
in mentioning topology, it is because the term points to the need to 
attend closely to how one registers, analyses, and represents the dynam-
ics, connections, breaks and transformations to which entities captured 
through a language of ‘the topological’ are subject. Those entities might 
be collaborative groups, experimental situations, or biosocial entities. 
What has been vital to this topological turn is attention to how nodes 
and edges are being defined: topological analyses are built around nodes 
and those connections that enjoin them. One way to think about this 
is to imagine how things might shift if different objects or technologies 
were set to fold into one another within interdisciplinary space – or if we 
brought to visibility often ignored nodes that might be present within 
the collaborative groups, experimental situations or biosocial entities 
under investigation. (One interesting example here is the ‘multispecies 
network analysis’ conducted by Michael Pettit and colleagues to under-
stand historical relations between scientists, their preferred experimental 
animals, and institutions during inter-war research on sexual behaviour, 
and hence to demonstrate the often unacknowledged importance of 
particular laboratory animals in the constitution of distinct discipli-
nary and institutional cultures (Pettit, Serykh, and Green 2015).) We 
are reminded, here, of some of the most imaginative interdisciplinary 
neuroscientific studies that have been conducted within the laboratory 
of Andreas Roepstorff at Aarhus University (a sometime collaborator 
of ours) – in which the edges of anthropological and neurobiological 
accounts of intersubjectivity are rendered continuous, with intellect 
and attention coming to rest on the forms of enjambment that might 
run them together (see e.g. Xygalatas et al. 2011). What distinguishes the 
 Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0008
intensely interdisciplinary work of Roepstorff and his collaborators is 
precisely this attention to the space of continuity, and to the forms of 
nodularity and edgework (both inside and outside the scanner) through 
which those continuities are made empirically visible.
Incorporations
Psychoanalysis proposes very different accounts of relationality, social-
ity, and negativity from many of those found within social and cultural 
theory. We could not be further from a world of happy zones of neigh-
bourly exchange (or even from a world of carefully plotted poaching 
and trespass). What would it mean to think interdisciplinary spatialities 
and temporalities through, and with, the relationalities offered by Freud 
(or by many of those who followed him), instead of with the sanitized 
models of the ‘inter-’ that have colonized many formal and informal 
accounts of interdisciplinarity? For Freud, for example, incorporation 
marked the primitive wish to unite with, identify with, or cannibalisti-
cally annihilate an object. Within psychoanalysis more broadly, incor-
poration – theorized as a mode of ferocious identification – is one of the 
most foundational kinds of relationality (Laplanche and Pontalis 1968). 
It is this dynamic of ferocity and pleasure that distinguishes the spatial 
mode of incorporation. It is also a relational logic that is frequently at 
play within interdisciplinary projects, though its pleasures (and its 
dangers) are rarely acknowledged. Such a relational logic makes clear 
the indispensability of negativity in any account of relationality. Such 
indispensability has been perhaps made most clear by a dense braid of 
cultural-theoretical work in the humanities, which has been indebted 
both to Freud and to the foundational insights of queer theory (e.g. 
Edelman 2004). While much of this work has been quickly designated as 
‘anti-social’, we are more interested in how it deforms our usual under-
standings of social relations. As Elizabeth Wilson has argued:
negativity is intrinsic (rather than antagonistic) to sociality and subjectivity ... , 
and this makes a world of difference politically. This queer work isn’t antiso-
cial at all; rather, it wants to build theories that can stomach the fundamental 
involvement of negativity in sociality and subjectivity. (Wilson 2015, 6)
We have been keen in our research not to extrude negative, ferocious, 
and corrosive forms of relation and of sociality. (Outside of our empiri-
cal research within the interdisciplinary neuroscience–social science 
domain, one of us (FC) has been particularly interested in how these 
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problematics are recognized or ignored in the course of interdisciplinary 
‘transfers’ of terms and knowledges, for example: in the taming of psycho-
analysis within geography (Callard 2003); in the use of scientific models 
of affect within the humanities and social sciences (Papoulias and Callard 
2010); or in the strange disavowal of Freud’s uncanny relationalities in the 
nascent field of neuropsychoanalysis (Papoulias and Callard 2012).) We 
are also interested in our own desires for identification with the biologi-
cal – desires whose reasoned articulation (and we are sometimes not even 
capable of such articulation) always leaves us slightly unfulfilled.
Processes such as incorporation push us, in turn, to acknowledge how 
our collaborations do not bring us together as rational economic actors, 
across (what are thought to be) disciplinary lines, engaging in friendly 
exchange with our neighbours. We – and ‘we’ is employed broadly, here – 
are also propelled by preconscious and unconscious acts of ferocious 
identification with, ambivalence regarding, and envy of the other. The 
question then is: what kind of organizational and spatial logics might 
emerge from, or at least take account of, such unruly forms of relation? 
Or does this term remind us, rather, that there are (infantile, primitive) 
desires for proximity and ingestion that it might be as well to sate as to 
understand? How would our interactions with our collaborators change 
if we understood ourselves all to be variously constituted through and by 
ambivalence, envy, and ferocious acts of identification?
Laboratories
At least since the early work of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986), 
the laboratory – as a physical space, a set of procedures, and an arrange-
ment of people and things – has been the site of intense interest within 
the history of science, and science and technology studies. The labora-
tory, as Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer point out in their seminal 
account of the debate between Boyle and Hobbes (1989), emerged in the 
seventeenth century as a space of constrained tinkering, witnessing, and 
demonstrating; it has a specific history within the natural sciences that 
is not only much less obvious or necessary than is often imagined, but 
is a good deal less innocent too (Haraway 1997). Laboratory is a capa-
cious term, holding together not only a space of demonstration (e.g. 
the MRI suite) but also a norm of investigation (a laboratory science), 
as well as a highly contingent group (such as ‘my lab’) bound together 
around particular questions (see also Knorr Cetina 1992). But it is the 
choreography holding these different senses of laboratory together 
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that captures our attention here: a laboratory calls a group together; it 
directs attention to careful arrangements of humans and non-humans 
that make up a particular laboratory assemblage; and it sets out norms, 
within such an assemblage, for who must demonstrate, and who must 
witness, and from where they must do it in either case. Additionally, 
laboratories, as the historian of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has 
argued, pose the question of how experimental knowledge is captured 
through various modes of writing, tracing, and recording: ‘[r]eduction 
to a surface facilitates exploration of new ways of ordering and arranging 
data: sequential events can be presented in synchronic form’. Rheinberger 
asks, furthermore, whether there might be ‘ “collective” equivalents of 
such individual forms of scientific note-taking and write-ups’, such that 
one might discern collaborative graphic traces that might tell us not only 
about the cultures of a particular laboratory, but might provoke new 
research questions (Rheinberger 2010, 251). What might this mean for 
practices of collaborative interdisciplinarity across the neurosciences, 
social sciences, and humanities? (We are particularly gripped by this 
question, given that we are currently collaborating with many research-
ers from the humanities and the arts, for whom graphic traces are central 
to their own experimental practices.)
Lately, such a choreography has been invoked by a range of interdis-
ciplinary centres, such as the MIT Media Lab, the Urban Laboratory at 
University College London, or the Culture Lab at Newcastle University. 
One of us (DF) worked on a project that calls itself an ‘urban brain lab’, 
where the word is invoked precisely to associate with a particular kind 
of, and normative commitment to, proximity with others and their 
work – viz. a cathexis of people, disciplines, and interests in which the 
arrangement of those elements is prioritized above each individual’s 
intellectual histories. One might see similar commitment in the various 
groupings that have described themselves as ‘collaboratories’ (see e.g. 
Collier n.d.). If ‘laboratory’ is a troubled term for many social scientists, 
it is not a ludicrous one. Spatially and temporally, one of its greatest 
advantages is that it moves us beyond many of the fantasies that many 
social scientists orient themselves towards (such as the ‘the interpretive 
and authorial virtuosity of an individual’, as Andrew Lakoff and his 
colleagues have argued (Lakoff, Collier, and Rabinow 2006, 5)). What 
would it meant to reimagine ourselves as co-workers experimenting 





The atmosphere was one of a strained energetics: all of us, delegates at an inter-
disciplinary workshop, were wanting – in fact, longing – to find points of connec-
tion and reassurance across what might have been seen as yawning disciplinary 
divides. Our expertise stretched from early medieval history, to early modern 
history, to cognitive psychology, to medical humanities, to geography. Each of us, 
in the course of the workshop, had been plunged, during talks, into the strange 
alterity of worlds and modes of academic presentation very different from our 
own; many in the room had discerned wonderful and startling connections 
between accounts of people’s sensory perceptions in different time periods, and 
current models in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience to investigate 
those phenomena. Delegates frequently used phrases such as ‘this reminds me of 
something from my own field’; ‘this resonates with a concept from my discipline’; 
‘it seems to be the same formulation’. Felicity began to wonder if we weren’t all 
working rather too hard, and if there might not be something to be said, ulti-
mately, for sometimes not connecting.
In this chapter, we have worked with and through some of the spatio-
temporal imaginaries through which researchers might plot as well as 
practise interdisciplinary research. We have used four terms (which are 
also, and variously, phenomena, constructs, abstractions, and metaphori-
cal resources) to open up ways of conceptualizing the spatial organization 
of interdisciplinarity that push beyond those indebted to particular ways 
of carving territory and terrain, and that centre on producing connec-
tion, entanglement, and ingestion in the collaborative sphere.
Yet one important problem remains. In the current impetus towards 
collaboration, there is, we suggest, an implicit normative assumption of 
connection itself, and indeed of relationality as such. What happens to 
collaboration when connection is impossible to refuse? What becomes of 
those ontological and epistemological voids – which is to say, those spaces 
and temporalities that cannot be produced or even glimpsed within the 
current dispensation? Paul Harrison has argued, in response to the inter-
est across a number of disciplines in ‘relation’ and ‘relationality’ (and here 
our earlier invocations of matrices and topologies are two such instances), 
that the question of the non-relational is at threat of occlusion:
it seems to me that in the proliferation of biophilosophy, the unstoppable 
materialisation of actor networks and constructivist totalisations of the social 
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or the cultural, few have been asking about breaks and gaps, interruptions 
and intervals, caesuras and tears. (Harrison 2007, 592)
For Harrison, much more work is required to think through what is 
‘meant by the term “relation” ’ if we are not simply to produce a ‘quan-
titatively expanded sociospatial imaginary rather than a shift towards 
the appreciation of intervallic topologies, complex figures, and diverse 
phrases and regimens’ (Harrison 2007, 590). Consider, in this respect, 
the nascent interdisciplinary field of neuropsychoanalysis (Panksepp 
and Solms 2011). That field has founded itself on the conviction that it is 
possible to bring together psychoanalysis, (certain kinds of cognitive and 
affective) neuroscience, and evolutionary biology. But what gets missed, 
in such an insistence, are precisely the things that might not go together. 
Consider, for example, against that insistence, Jean Laplanche’s readings 
of Freud (e.g. Laplanche 1989), which force to the surface the impossibil-
ity of making Freud’s account ‘consonant with a model of the organism 
that is centred around adaptive need’ (Papoulias and Callard 2012, 211). 
We retain an anxiety that our focus on spatial logics of collaboration is 
already a refusal of this impossibility. We want to learn to collaborate in 
a world that is constituted as much through voids and non-relation as 
through contact and relation.
Notes & Queries: 5
Q: What kinds of people do I need for an interdisciplinary project involv-
ing the neurosciences, social sciences (and, perhaps, the humanities)? 
How do I arrange them?
A: This is a complex question – and one that opens in multiple 
directions, depending on the kind of phenomena you want to 
investigate, and the kinds of research you are interested in conduct-
ing. We wouldn’t for a moment want to imply that one can specify 
in advance the kinds of people one would need without attending 
to the particularities of a potential project. What we would say, 
however – and this is in the interests of departing from the ‘layer 
cake’ model we have described in this chapter – is that it’s worth 
thinking carefully before you decide you ‘need’ a psychologist, or 
an anthropologist, or a sociologist, or a cognitive neuroscientist, or 
a clinical researcher to make your interdisciplinary project work. It 
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might be helpful to explore the function that this initially perceived 
‘need’ is serving and to disarticulate expertise in particular methods 
(performing statistical regressions; translating medieval Latin texts) 
from expertise in a discipline. There is also the important question 
of how appropriate expertise to take part in an interdisciplinary 
project does not necessarily map neatly on to seniority.
In many of the interdisciplinary projects in which we have been 
involved, we have been struck by: (1) what emerges – what topologi-
cal relations unfold – from having people in the room with expertise 
in disciplines not commonly regarded as central to interdiscipli-
nary neuroscientific projects (e.g. a poet, a medieval historian, a 
composer); (2) the torqueing of various disciplinary or discursive 
assumptions when the project includes people with varied disci-
plinary trainings (e.g. we are thinking of one of our collaborators 
who has expertise in computer science, anthropology, science and 
technology studies, and the history of science).
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